

## Message Text

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43

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 PRS-01 CIAE-00

INR-07 NSAE-00 AID-05 EB-07 /056 W  
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P R 1201015Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8107

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY KUALALUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

S E C R E T JAKARTA 5711

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP C) FOR ID US

SUBJ: YOUR VISIT TO INDONESIA: SCOPE PAPER

REF: JAKARTA 4875

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB

1. YOUR VISIT TO JAKARTA WILL COME AT TIME WHEN INDONESIANS ARE DETERMINING THEIR FUTURE POLICIES FOLLOWING COLLAPSE NON-COMMUNIST FORCES IN INDOSHINA. WHILE BASIC INDONESIAN POLICY WILL REMAIN MODERATELY NON-ALIGNED EXTERNALLY AND STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST INTERNALLY, YOU WILL ENCOUNTER DIFFERENT TENDENCIES WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK. FOREIGN MINISTER MALIK LEANS TOWARD PURSUIT OF RELATIONS WITH NEW INDOCHINESE REGIMES AND , PROBABLY, WITH CHINA TOO, AND TO PURSUE THESE GOALS WOULD HAVE INDONESIA JOIN THOSE CALLING FOR US MILITARY WITHDRAWL FROM SEA. MILITARY LEADERS MORE CAUTIOUS, HOPE FOR RELIABLE BILATERAL LINKS WITH US, CONTINUED US PRESENCE, AND SLOWER APPROACH TO COMMUNIST REGIMES. ENIGMATIC SUHARTO PROBABLY SITS SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN.

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2. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM YOU WILL FACE IS LOSS OF  
INDONESIAN CONFIDENCE IN CREDIBILITY US EXECUTIVE.  
DURING PAST YEAR, INITIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH AID  
REDUCTIONS AND LATER IN RELATION INDOCHINA, INDONESIANS  
MORE THAN EVER AWARE THAT EXECUTIVE PROPOSES BUT CONGRESS  
DISPOSES. IN INTERNAL INDONESIAN DEBATE, QUESTION IS  
PROBABLY LESS OVER WHETHER CLOSE TIES WITH US SHOULD  
BE CONTINUED AND US PRESENCE IN SEA ENCOURAGED THAN  
OVER WHETHER US (MEANING CONGRESS) WILLING SUPPORT  
EITHER. TO EXTENT CONCLUSION ON LATTER POINT IS NEGATIVE,  
LEADERSHIP HERE INCLINED TO LEAN TOWARD TYPE OF THINKING  
REPRESENTED BY MALIK (ABOVE).

3. WOULD BE UNREALISTIC, IN OUR VIEW, TO GIVE IM-  
PRESSION USG (EXECUTIVE OR CONGRESS) NOT IN MIDST OF  
EVALUATING INDOCHINA COLLAPSE AND ASSESSING ITS MEANING  
FOR FUTURE USG POLICIES. NOVERTHELESS, DRAWING ON YOUR  
OWN EXPERIENCE, YOU WILL WANT TO ATRESS THAT CONTINUED  
US ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS NOT ONLY EXECUTIVE  
OBJECTIVE BUT HAS BIPARTIKAN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT. TO  
EXTENT YOU FEEL POSSIBLE, BELIEVE IT IS VALUABLE TO  
STRESS HERE THAT A) INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA WAS SPECIAL  
CASE IN WHICH CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE WAS CONTROVERSIAL AND B)  
CONTINUED US MILITARY PRESENCE THROUGH SEVENTHFLT,  
TREATIES WITH PHILIPPINES, KOREA, JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA-  
NEW ZEALAND, AND DETERMINATION MAINTAIN MILITARY BALANCE  
WITH SOVIETS HAVE CLEAR CONGRESSIONAL MANDATES.

4. SIMILARLY, ON BILATERAL MATTERS, YOU SHOULD STRESS  
THAT, DESPITE OBVIOUS PROBLEMS OF WHICH THEY ARE AWARE  
(OPEC MEMBERSHIP, OIL REVENUES, NEEDS ELSEWHERE)  
EXECUTIVE RECEIVED CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR CONCESSIONAL  
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN FY 1975 AND IS  
SEEKING SIMILAR SUPPORT IN FY 1976. WE WILL WANT TO  
DISCUSS, AFTER YOUR ARRIVAL, WHETHER AND HOW BEST TO  
RAISE CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN OVER HUMAN RIGHTS.

5. WE HAVE REQUESTED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SUHARTO ON  
BASIS THAT YOU ARE PRINCIPAL ADVISER TO SECRETARY ON  
EAST ASIA AND WILL PLAY KEY ROLE IN PLANNING FORTH-  
COMING MEETING BETWEEN SUHARTO AND PRESIDENT FORD. BEST  
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OPENING APPROACH WILL BE TO SAY PRESIDENT FORD LOOKING  
FORWARD TO MEETING AND TO HEARING SUHARTO'S VIEWS ON  
EAST ASIA SITUATION. PRESIDENT FORD WILL WELCOME  
PRELIMINARY EXPRESSION OF SUHARTO'S VIEWS AND IDENTIFI-  
CATION OF ANY SPECIAL MATTERS PRESIDENT SUHARTO MAY WISH  
DISCUSS AT CAMP DAVID.

6. CERTAIN QUESTIONS FROM INDONESIANS ARE ALMOST INEVITABLE. THEY WILL REALIZE YOU MAY NOT YET HAVE ANSWERS, BUT WILL ASK ANYWAY: DO WE SEE HANOI ULTIMATELY DOMINATING ALL OF INDOCHINA? WILL HANOI BE UNDER DOMINANCE PEKING OR MOSCOW, OR NEITHER? WHAT DO WE BELIEVE DANGER TO ASEAN COUNTRIES TO BE IN NEXT FEW YEARS? WERE WE ABLE TO RETRIEVE OR DESTROY ANY APPRECIABLE AMOUNT US ARMS AND EQUIPMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM? DO WE PLAN AID TO COMMUNIST INDOCHINA? WHAT WILL BE OUR FUTURE POLICY ON US BASES IN AREA? ON FLEET PRESENCE? WHAT DO WE THINK OF ASEAN?

7. GOI OFFICIALS, PERHAPS AWARE OF PROBLEMS AND RELUCTANT HAVE NEGATIVE ANSWER, HAVE OF LATE NOT PRESSED ON VISITORS DIRECT REQUESTS FOR MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THEIR INTEREST AND NEED NEVERTHELESS REMAINS AND THEY WILL EXPECT FROM YOUR ASSESSMENT AS TO FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN BOTH FIELDS. OUR POSTURE AND OUTCOME AT IGGI MEETING WILL GOVERN ECONOMIC AID DISCUSSIONS. ON MILITARY AID THEY WILL WANT TO KNOW WHETHER, IN ADDITION CONTINUATION GRANT AID AND FMS ANY FURTHER SALES OF SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT OUT OF INVENTORY POSSIBLE. VIEW MAY SURFACE THAT, WITH FINANCIAL BURDEN INDOCHINA REMOVED, US SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE MORE SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE TO NON-COMMUNIST SEA GOVERNMENTS. ARMED FORCES DEPUTY CINC SURONO, WHOM YOU WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SEE, HAS ALREADY MENTIONED INFORMALLY LARGE NUMBER OF PLANES FLOWN FROM VIETNAM TO THAILAND AND MAY RAISE POSSIBILITY THEIR ACQUIRING SOME OF THESE OR OTHER SURPLUS EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM.

8. OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH MAY ARISE; YOUR ASSESSMENT POSSIBILITY REMOVAL TITLE V TRADE ACT RESTRICTIONS ON OPEC COUNTRIES, VIETNAM REFUGEES (YOU SHOULD SEE  
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JAKARTA 5158 AND 5709) AND WHAT US SEES AS NEXT STEP IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OIL PRODUCERS FOLLOWING RECENT PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE PARIS. NEWSOM

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NNN

\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET

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